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INTRODUCTION
Ten years after the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),' its
mention now stirs as much bipartisan grumbling as it initially boasted biparti-
san celebration. At its signing ceremony, the late liberal lion Ted Kennedy
and newly minted conservative President George W. Bush stood
shoulder-to-shoulder, embracing a new framework for American education. It
seemed that perhaps we had removed politics from education and had finally
commenced the work of improving educational outcomes for all children.
One decade later, bemoaning NCLB has become a guaranteed applause line
for any politician of any party before any audience. So what has changed? And
what would it take to design a reauthorized NCLB that could gather political
support and catalyze lasting change? Finding the way forward requires an
honest assessment of NCLB's failures and a new framework for how to move
forward with the reauthorization of a new NCLB. Accordingly, this Essay
addresses some of the major mistakes in NCLB and proposes a new framework
for its reauthorization-a framework that will move our national attention
from NCLB's flawed focus on inputs toward a new focus on outputs.
* Senator Mike Johnston represents Northeast Denver in the Colorado State Senate
and serves as a policy advisor to New Leaders for New Schools. He previously
worked as a high school English teacher in Greenville, Mississippi; cofounded the
nonprofit organization New Leaders for New Schools; and cofounded MESA
(Mapleton Expeditionary School of the Arts), a redesigned urban high school in
the Mapleton Public Schools. Senator Johnston earned a Bachelor of Arts degree
from Yale University in 1997, a Masters in Education Policy from Harvard Univer-
sity in 200o, and a law degree from Yale Law School in 2003. Thanks to Bill Ful-
ton, Jon Schnur, and David Coleman for their comments on early drafts, and my
deepest gratitude to Damion Lee Natali, whose relentless wisdom ennobles every-
thing he touches, including this Essay.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
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I. AN NCLB SCORECARD: "PARTIALLY PROFICIENT"
One can compare NCLB to the Ford Model T; no one would want to drive
it today, but its bold invention created a new paradigm for modern transporta-
tion. In form and function, NCLB is not unlike the Model T: NCLB is clumsy
and imperfect, and when it was passed, we lacked enough technological sophis-
tication in our assessments and data management to show what was possible in
education and how those aims could be realized. But Ford had the audacity to
make the Model T a vehicle of egalitarianism, defying the paradigm that cars
were only for the elite. In its promise that children of all backgrounds can
achieve at the highest levels, NCLB shares this boldness.
NCLB initiated three tectonic shifts in federal education policy that deserve
special attention for their failures as much as their successes: (1) introducing the
notion of nationwide accountability in education, (2) pushing teacher quality to
the forefront of our national dialogue, and (3) taking steps to use quantitative
assessments in our evaluation of the education system.
More than any other piece of federal education legislation, NCLB intro-
duced the concept that the nation's education system should be accountable for
its results. Before NCLB, there was little or no ability to compare the
performance of students within the same school system, much less students
within the same state. NCLB insisted that states and districts must measure and
report student performance to create transparency for students, parents, and
teachers alike.
To accomplish this, NCLB required each state to create academic standards,
to use standardized tests aligned to those standards, and to publish that data for
public consumption.' The flood of NCLB reporting data was a success in itself.
For the first time, we had disaggregated state data that painted a picture of
student-, school-, and district-level performance. As never before, this informa-
tion spotlighted the persistent achievement gaps between affluent and
low-income students.3 And, for the first time, this stark portrait began to create
demands for consequences in schools, districts, and states in which the educa-
tion system continued to fail. 4
2. 20 U.S.C. § 63 11(b) (2006).
3. See Inst. of Educ. Scis., The Condition of Education, NAT'L CENTER EDUC.
STAT., U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coelfigures/figure
-trc-1.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2on) (demonstrating the consistent gap between
affluent and low-income students in terms of enrollment in colleges following
high school).
4. In California, for example, parents coalesced around a so-called "parent-trigger"
law, which allows parents to force changes at low-performing schools. See Teresa
Watanabe, Defining Rules on School Reform: State Board Maps Out Procedure To
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Despite the value of this unsettling portrait, it is only half-complete. NCLB
was right to rely on standardized tests as a method of measuring achievement,
but, in many places, the tests employed were not yet rigorous, comparable, or
useful. Even today, assessments do not deliver achievement data in real time
(most districts wait four to six months to get test data back). The data that is
delivered is not especially useful for teachers because the tests are based on
low-rigor academic standards and assessments, and they do not measure a bal-
ance of twenty-first century skills like critical analysis, creativity, and collabora-
tion. In short, to accomplish the goals of NCLB, tests should be faster, more
sophisticated, and more functional.
NCLB made an unforeseen mistake by allowing the states to create their
own academic content standards.' Despite the fact that NCLB required the
standards to be "challenging,"' the law did not define that term, thus leaving it
to the states to define the level of rigor for themselves. The results were predict-
able: Faced with the prospect of punitive federal interventions for poor academ-
ic performance, states simply turned to the lowest common denominator by
dumbing down standards and assessments. In this way, students were miracu-
lously labeled "proficient" despite scoring significantly lower than their peers in
other states and countries.
NCLB's delegation of standard writing to the states has thus sparked a
national race to the bottom while simultaneously making it harder to compare
performance across the country. With no incentive to create rigorous standards
and assessments, but every incentive to boost the number of students scoring
"proficient," many states have rushed to create low-rigor standards and
assessments.' This creates comparison difficulties. With every state adopting
different academic standards and assessments, students labeled "proficient" in
one state would be considered "unsatisfactory" in another.! Thus, aside from
infrequently administered international assessments, there is no way to
uniformly gauge student performance across the country.9
5. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (2006).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Scott Conroy, "No Child Left Behind": State Tests Vary, CBSNEWS (June
30, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo7/o5/3o/notebook/main2867441.shtml
(finding that Georgia's fourth-grade students boasted an 87% proficiency rate on a
state reading test despite scoring at 26% proficiency on a national reading test).
8. Id.
9. Policymakers and educators across the country are currently working to address
these problems by developing new assessments that are aligned to the Common
Core State Standards. This is a comprehensive set of standards drafted by a collec-
tion of states under the aegis of the National Governors' Association. Far from
"federalizing" what our students should learn, the Standards are state-created
academic standards that align to the twenty-first century skills that students need
in a globalized economy. See COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2on).
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Finally, in what has become a cruel irony, state efforts to comply with
NCLB's reporting requirements have revealed that NCLB dramatically underes-
timated the enormity of the achievement gap. As we acquire more and better
data from NCLB reporting, we now know that achievement gaps between white
and minority students are so large (and so persistent) that the goal of 100% pro-
ficiency by 2014 is impossibly out of reach.10
But none of this suggests that the founding principles of NCLB should be
abandoned. By learning from the successes of the last decade, drawing on the
law's strengths, and courageously addressing its flaws, the NCLB reauthoriza-
tion can still make historic progress toward an education system that ensures
success for all children.
II. MOVING EDUCATION FROM INPUTS TO OUTCOMES
The reauthorization of NCLB affords us a unique opportunity to redirect
the national education agenda. To do that effectively, we must shift the focus of
the current conversation from inputs (e.g., how much money we spend, how
many degrees our teachers have, how well-prepared students are initially, etc.)
to outcomes: how effective our teachers and principals are, how much students
improve through a year's instruction, and what results we receive for the
funding we invest. What follows is a vision for realigning our federal policy to
value outcomes over inputs, with a specific focus on students, educators,
schools, and funding.
A. Outcomes for Students: Growth over Status
With a narrow focus on one achievement data point in time, the proficien-
cy scores under NCLB do not help students, parents, or the public to evaluate
student or school performance. NCLB should instead follow the path of the
leading states, which have built accountability systems based on growth." While
we must continue to focus on the long-term goal of seeing every child reach
academic proficiency, the indicator that often matters most for parents and
educators is how much a child is improving from year to year, not a static
number or label that has little relation to previous (or future) performance.
10. Achievement Gap, EDUC. WK. (July 7, 2011), www.edweek.org/ew/issues/
achievement-gap (stating that black and Hispanic students continue to trail their
white counterparts by as many as two grade levels in math and reading).
ni. See, e.g., Colorado Growth Model, COLO. DEPARTMENT EDUc., http://www.cde
.state.co.us/research/GrowthModel.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Tennessee
Value-Added Assessment System, TENN. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://www.tn.gov/
education/assessment/test results.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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NCLB started with status-based growth measures (test scores on an abso-
lute scale)," but it opened the way for breakthroughs like the Colorado Growth
Model and the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System, both of which
measure student academic growth over time. 3 These measures actually help
parents determine whether a particular classroom, school, or model is support-
ing their students' academic achievement, and they also help parents and
students focus on attainable targets that inspire them to make real progress. At
the system level, growth measures can possibly help neutralize the stigma of
neighborhoods and schools with low rates of proficiency by focusing on how
much progress students make along the way, not solely on where they start or
finish. Growth measures thus enable us to identify and reward the schools that
are making dramatic gains with students, not just the schools that enrolled
students with high test scores.
These growth measures can fundamentally change our definition of success
for individual students, educators, and entire schools. Under the flawed NCLB
system, we assumed many schools were doing a poor job based solely on their
proficiency scores: Thus, a school with 35% proficiency rates in
fourth-grade reading was thought to be a bad school, while a school with 85%
proficiency was thought to be a good school. But by focusing on growth, mod-
els like Colorado's have revealed that some of the most effective schools were
schools with low overall proficiency but extremely high levels of growth. 4 Put
simply, the 35% proficiency school is a triumph once one realizes that the fourth
graders there were starting the year at o% proficiency. And, by contrast, some of
the most "successful" schools (those showing 85% proficiency) were actually
coasting; after all, scoring 85% proficient does not seem nearly as impressive
when 95% of the students started the year proficient."
12. Adequately Yearly Progress, see infra note 29, only considers whether students are
proficient or not. It does not consider the amount of student growth over time.
13. Colorado Growth Model, supra note n1; Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System,
supra note ii.
14. For example, one of Colorado's most successful charter school networks-West
Denver Preparatory-has consistently high growth (at one campus, a 94 median
growth percentile in math and a 71 median growth percentile in reading) but low-
er overall proficiency rates (76% proficiency in math and 62% proficiency in read-
ing). State, District, and School Performance, SCHOOLVIEW, http://www
.schoolview.org/performance.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). A median growth
percentile is calculated by ordering all student growth scores, selecting the median
score, and then comparing the percentile growth against the median. SchoolView
Growth Model FAQs (General), SCHooLVIEW, http://www.schoolview.org/
GMFAQ.asp#Q21 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
15. This is most tragically illustrated by the impact on high-performing students in
the United States. The United States ranks thirty-first out of fifty-six industria-
lized nations in terms of the percentage of students scoring "Advanced" in math.
ERIC A. HANUSHEK, PAUL E. PETERSON & LUDGER WOESSMANN, U.S. MATH PER-
FORMANCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2o1o), available at http://www.hks
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B. Outcomes for Educators: Moving from Qualifications to Effectiveness
NCLB must move beyond its current framework, which focuses exclusively
on teacher qualifications, and replace it with a framework that focuses on
teacher effectiveness. This means discarding our old metrics for measuring
teacher quality-certifications, degrees, and training programs-and replacing
them with reliable metrics tied to effectiveness.
The current NCLB teacher-quality metric, which focuses on certification
with no attention to educator effectiveness, is the wrong model. This metric
hoped to identify and redress a crucial problem at the time: A large number of
teachers who were teaching outside of their accredited subject area, and these
teachers were disproportionately placed in classrooms with low-income and
minority students." Although we know that content-area expertise in secondary
math and science does correlate positively to teacher effectiveness," there is a
clear distinction between content-area expertise and the certification required
to get a teaching license. Most licensure programs do not provide extensive
content-area training but instead focus on pedagogy and instructional strate-
gies. Indeed, there is no direct linkage between certification and actual teacher
effectiveness." Yet, we do know that the effectiveness of the classroom teacher is
the single most important in-school factor for determining student success,'9
and so our licensing and accreditation process should focus on a teacher's
overall effectiveness-not where they received their certification or how many
.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/PEPGlo-19_HanushekPetersonWoessmann.pdf. If
U.S. performance on an international test is disaggregated by state, Massachusetts
is the state with the highest percentage of high performers, but it would still rank
behind fourteen other countries that have higher percentages of high performers.
Id. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the gains of high-performing stu-
dents are slow or stagnant relative to their lower-performing peers. Stephanie
Banchero, Brightest Stall, Low Achievers Gain on Tests, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2011,
at A3 (noting that, "of the 17 subject exams given in elementary and high school
over the past decade, top-scoring kids showed progress on only four" while "the
lowest achievers improved on ii exams").
16. CRAIG D. JERALD & RICHARD INGERSOLL, ALL TALK, No ACTION: PUTTING AND
[sic] END TO OUT-OF-FIELD TEACHING 6 (2002), available at http://repository
.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=u42&context=gse-pubs; see also MARILYN
MCMILLEN SEASTROM ET AL., QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER
WORKFORCE: PREVALENCE OF OUT-OF-FIELD TEACHING, 1987-88 TO 1999-2000, at
9-12 (2002), available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2oo2/2oo2603.pdf.
17. DAN D. GOLDHABER & DOMINIC J. BREWER, EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF TEACH-
ER DEGREE LEVEL ON EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE 206 (1996), available at
http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs97/975351.pdf.
18. Thomas J. Kane, Jonah E. Rockoff & Douglas 0. Staiger, What Does Certification
Tell Us About Teacher Effectiveness?, 27 EcON. EDUC. REV. 615 (20o8).
19. Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and Aca-
demic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417 (2005).
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hours of coursework they completed. These inputs to a teacher's training are
not nearly as important as the outcomes demonstrated by the student learning
that happens in their classroom.
Thus, instead of focusing on teacher qualifications, we should move to
effectiveness-based metrics for hiring and evaluating teachers. These metrics
will need to be robust and complex, including evaluation of teachers' instruc-
tional practices from supervisors, peers, and students. Most importantly, these
metrics should include measures of student growth as a core component.
This is a dramatic shift toward an outcome-based regime for educators, as
it ceases to focus on front-end qualifications and instead focuses on results in
classrooms. The immediate resistance to this transition would likely come from
those who believe that requiring higher qualifications is the only way to protect
or increase the prestige of the teaching profession.2 0 These people believe that
we should add more coursework, seat time, and specialization for teachers
before they enter the classroom, instead of making teaching more competitive
by attracting a much larger and more diverse body of applicants who deliver
reliable and dramatic results in the classroom. Such opponents argue that re-
ducing the certification requirements will reduce the professionalism of
teaching by signaling that anyone can teach." These critics argue that the pro-
fession is already losing its prestige, and that higher teacher salaries are the only
way to attract the best and brightest. To be sure, one of our top priorities should
be to pay teachers more," but to make the case for increasing compensation, we
must first increase the prestige of the teaching profession.
Experience in other sectors demonstrates that opening up a labor market by
lowering barriers to entry makes a profession more selective. As universities
know, to drive up selectivity you can either (a) accept fewer applicants or (b)
attract more applicants. In a profession facing a major teacher shortage,
20. See Ensuring Teacher Quality, NAT'L EDUc. Ass'N, www.nea.org/home/29733.htm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (asserting that "[a]ll teacher preparation programs,
including alternative routes, should be accredited based on high standards set by
the profession").
21. See, e.g., Howard Gardner, To Improve U.S. Education, It's Time To Treat Teachers
as Professionals, WASH. POST (July 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/on-leadership/to-improve-us-education-its-time-to-treat-teachers
-as-professionals/2011/07/18/gIQA8oh2LI-story.html (asserting that "professionals
should work hard to gain the requisite credentials").
22. In the United States, a teacher with fifteen years of experience makes a salary that
is 96% of the country's gross domestic product per capita. Across industrialized
countries, a teacher of equivalent experience makes n7% of gross domestic prod-
uct per capita. ORG. FOR EcON. Co-OPERATION & DEv., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE
2009: OECD INDICATORS 399 tbl.D3.1 (2009), available at http://www.oecd
.org/dataoecd/41/25/43636332.pdf.
23. BRYON AUGUSTE, PAUL KIHN & MATT MILLER, CLOSING THE TALENT GAP:
ATTRACTING AND RETAINING TOP-THIRD GRADUATES TO CAREERS IN TEACHING:
AN INTERNATIONAL AND MARKET RESEARCH-BASED PERSPECTIVE 11 (2010),
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accepting fewer applicants is impossible, meaning that the best chance to
increase selectivity and status in the teaching profession is to increase the num-
ber of applicants. We need to lower the barriers to entry while also making it
easier to dismiss and replace unsatisfactory teachers, thus ensuring competition
and the concomitant prestige of entering an elite profession.
Thus conceived, this model begins to mirror most private sector
businesses-including consulting, financial management, and advertising-
where all are welcome to apply, highly talented managers know what they are
looking for, and very clear metrics support employee improvement and success
after arrival (or dismissal if they fail to meet those metrics).
We can provide our struggling teachers with very clear avenues for
improvement, coupled with the urgency that there are a dozen applicants in
line behind them who would like their position if they do not fulfill certain
requirements. This high level of accountability would create the political will to
restore the status of the teaching profession by raising salaries for teachers. And
we would make that financial investment not because our teacher salaries lag
behind other countries, but because we see that there is no better return on our
investment than attracting and retaining highly effective educators.
Finally, by working to define and measure teacher and principal effective-
ness, we can work to evaluate which programs, training, and professional devel-
opment methods contribute the most to teacher effectiveness. In this way, we
can signal that we are looking to ensure the teaching profession the status and
respect it deserves by making it more selective in its recruitment, more rigorous
in its evaluation, and more reliable in its metrics. Only then will we begin to
treat our best educators like the national treasures they are.
C. Outcomes for Schools: Courage on School Turnaround
Although it was not the first initiative to propose grading schools, NCLB
brought this idea to the national stage. Indeed, we can now use NCLB reporting
data to identify schools that are high-performing, average, or "dropout facto-
ries" (Secretary of Education Arne Duncan's term for high schools in which at
least 40% of the freshman class drops out)." This focus on transparency
available at http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Education/Closing
thetalent-gap.pdf (observing that 1.8 million of the 3.3 million teachers in the
United States will be eligible for retirement within the next io years).
24. For instance, Bain & Co., one of the world's most prestigious consulting and
financial management firms, places less emphasis on hard credentials like
undergraduate school or degree, and more emphasis on the "ability to think," fo-
cusing on intense apprenticeship. Your Background, JoiN BAIN & Co., http://www
.joinbain.com/build-your-career/your-background/default.asp (last visited Nov.
22, 2011).
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Secretary Arne Duncan's Remarks at the
Release of America's Promise Alliance Report, "Building a Grad Nation" (Nov. 30,
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brought the first wave of school closures based on performance, closures that
also sparked heated political battles.26
By addressing these dropout factories, NCLB indicated that it was not only
concerned that every child have access to an education, but also that every child
have access to a high-quality education. 7 This means that merely having the
right to enter school is not enough; the law was going to expect every child to
graduate ready for college or a career. Rather than just guaranteeing inputs,
NCLB stood for the proposition that we would expect certain outcomes for stu-
dents and hold their schools accountable if those outcomes were not met.
NCLB tried to address this problem, but the solutions were wanting
because they were at once overly prescriptive in areas that do not matter and
laissez faire in areas that do."8 NCLB first mandated that all schools make Ade-
quate Yearly Progress (AYP), or "continuous and substantial academic
improvement for all students." 9 Any school that fails to meet AYP for two con-
2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-release
-america%E2%8o%99s-promise-alliance-report-%E2%80%9Cbuilding-gra.
26. See, e.g., Katherine Boo, Expectations: Can the Students Who Became a Symbol of
Failed Reform Be Rescued?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2007, at 44 (documenting
then-Denver Superintendent Michael Bennet's efforts to close and reopen a fail-
ing school in inner-city Denver).
27. The predominant narrative of American public education for the past 200 years
has been about expanding access: first by extending education to non-landowners,
then non-aristocrats, then recent immigrants, then working-class children, then
women, then African-Americans, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), then a new wave of undocu-
mented immigrants, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and finally special educa-
tion students, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). After Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny, it therefore seemed as if America
had finally achieved universal access: Every child between the ages of five and
eighteen living in the United States had access to an education that met his or her
needs, regardless of race, color, national origin, intelligence, or disability. It would
have been possible to declare the American education reform effort complete at
that juncture; after all, that is largely what America has done with other major civ-
il rights questions. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241, guaranteed the right to vote, but it did not attempt to remedy the
massive and persistent voting disparities in poor communities of color. The Civil
Rights Act also prohibits race-based employment discrimination, id., but it does
not attempt to narrow the large discrepancy in hiring rates for minorities. Similar-
ly, minorities are entitled to apply to college, but the Supreme Court has ab-
olished racial balancing in the form of quotas at public colleges and universities.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Likewise, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3711 to 3797ee-1 (20o6), prohibits race-based housing discrimination, but it does
not prescribe solutions for the disparity in leasing rates to people of color.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (20o6).
29. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
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secutive years would be subject to "school improvement,"30 where the school
must design a plan to remediate its academic deficiencies.3' After two more
years of failing to make AYP, the school is identified for "corrective action,"
which might include replacing portions of the school staff, restructuring the or-
ganization of the school, or appointing an outside expert to coach the school
toward making AYP through curriculum restructuring or other methods?.3
If the school still fails to meet AYP after one year of corrective action (and a
total of five years after the school was originally identified as needing improve-
ment), the school is subject to the most aggressive intervention-
restructuring. 3 Under restructuring (commonly referred to as "turnaround"),
NCLB mandates that a school undertake one of five interventions: (I) reopen as
a public charter school, (2) replace most or all of the staff, (3) contract with an
outside entity to run the school, (4) turn operation of the school over to the
state, or (5) engage in "any other major restructuring of the school's governance
arrangement that makes fundamental reforms."3 4 Unfortunately, a case study of
five states found that between 86 and 96% of the schools facing "turnaround"
chose the last and least dramatic option-" other" restructuring-which
generally entails making marginal changes to curriculum or hiring "turnaround
specialists."35 This means that the worst-performing schools in the country are
not taking the kind of dramatic steps that could bring transformative change.
There is no doubt that the work of school turnarounds is incredibly hard
on students, neighborhoods, families, elected officials, and district leadership.
While these dropout factories have done immeasurable damage to their com-
munities, they have also been institutions in the community, and students and
parents alike may find it difficult to concede that their school is failing. For
many of these schools, the parents may also be alumni, and an indictment of
the school may resonate as an indictment of the parents' own education and
achievements.
For these reasons, deciding to close a school often costs superintendents,
mayors, and school board members more political capital than any other deci-
sion in education reform.36 Such political costs result in part because this type
of advocacy for underserved populations represents a systemic change from the
traditional civil rights work in the 196os. In the previous wave of education
30. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A).
31. Id. § 63 16(b)(3)(A).
32. Id. § 63 16(b)(7)(C)(iv).
33. Id. § 63 16(b)(8)(A).
34. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
35. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, A CALL To RESTRUCTURE RESTRUCTURING 10-11 (2008).
36. See, e.g., Yesenia Robles, Recall Effort Begun Against DPS Board President, DENVER
PosT, Jan. 20, 2011, at B4 (documenting a recall effort against a Denver school
board member after he approved a turnaround effort that centered on an entire
school-feeder pattern, making it one of the nation's largest turnaround efforts).
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reform, public officials were guaranteeing people individual access to public in-
stitutions; we were offering access to the franchise, to jury service, and to higher
education. Now, instead, we are looking to close or transform social institutions
that have been the bedrock of many communities. While the former felt like an
opened door, the latter may understandably feel like an eviction notice.
Nonetheless, turning around the lowest-performing schools is the linchpin
of a results-driven system like the one proposed here. The notable successes of
the past decade have shown that it is possible to turn around low-performing
schools through dramatic intervention." The schools that have closed and
reopened or converted to high-performing charters have shown dramatically
different outcomes with the same population of kids. In the former category,
Manual High School in Denver closed, reopened, and has since seen
larger-than-expected academic growth.38 In Boston, Orchard Gardens K-8
required that all staff members reapply for their positions, hired new faculty,
and, as a result, is currently improving in English scores and on target to meet
AYP in math.39 In the latter category, schools like West Denver Prep have
shown dramatic results in converting a low-performing school to a
high-performing charter school. 40
Because they attempt to remedy one of education's most intractable prob-
lems, turnarounds are not always easy and are not always successful. However,
the projects that have seen the most success, and that stand as examples to simi-
larly situated schools, are those that have used the most aggressive turnaround
strategies. This is why one of the most important outcomes of any NCLB
reauthorization must include an emphasis on comprehensive school turna-
round for our most troubled schools rather than superficial tinkering.
To accomplish this goal, the federal government will likely narrow
its accountability framework to cover fewer schools (that is, focus
performance-reporting requirements on the lowest-performing 10-25% of
schools in a state instead of requiring all schools to report on an annual basis).
However, even as we narrow the focus of school accountability, we must also
intensify the interventions required for poorly performing schools. This would
require eliminating a school's ability to opt for "other major restructuring."
Too often, this "other" option has allowed schools to pursue superficial changes
that are easy to enact but result in no lasting change. Such changes are the edu-
cational equivalent of rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. If we are to
37. See infra Table 1 (documenting the dramatic rise in test scores in an inner-city
Denver middle school after aggressive academic interventions).
38. See Boo, supra note 26; State, District, and School Performance, supra note 14.
39. MCAS Annual Comparisons: Orchard Gardens, MASs. DEPARTMENT ELEMENTARY
& SECONDARY EDuc., http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/mcas/mcascharts2.aspx?linkid
=33&orgcode=00350257&fycode=20n1orgtypecode=6& (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
40. See State, District, and School Performance, supra note 14 (select "o880 - Denver
County " for the school district, and "9390 - West Denver Prep-Lake Campus"
for the school).
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save the passengers, we have to be courageous enough to insist on effective
changes to the ship's structure and leadership. Insisting on rigorous and com-
prehensive intervention in the lowest-performing schools gives the best hope to
those kids whom we have supported the least.
D. Outcomes-Based Funding
In addition to renewing our focus on student outcomes by prioritizing
growth over absolute test scores, concentrating on teacher and principal
outcomes through refined evaluations, and emphasizing school-level outcomes
by maintaining rigorous requirements for school turnaround, it is also time to
build on the success of competitive grant programs like Race to the Top by
continuing to tie federal funding decisions to outcomes. One of the most
vociferous complaints about NCLB concerned the micromanagement that
came through mandates and overregulation. 41 Many funding streams are tied
directly to individual regulations or requirements that dramatically restrict how
money can be spent and what it can be spent on. Some states refuse to imple-
ment NCLB's provisions at all 42 and others built massive district infrastructures
to comply with the testing and reporting requirements of NCLB.
The Obama administration implemented a creative and effective way to
fundamentally change the nature of the state-federal relationship through the
expansion of Race to the Top and other competitive grant programs such as In-
vesting in Innovation. The power of these programs is that they (1) are entirely
voluntary; (2) allow states to develop their own education reform plans and
tailor them to match their own, specific needs; and (3) support courageous,
reform-minded states that are pursuing strategies that will help the entire
education system. The encouragement of bold action by states fulfills one of the
U.S. Department of Education's core functions: being the research and devel-
opment laboratory for education nationwide.43
Many state and district leaders say that they have seen more education
reform in the last two years than in the previous twenty;" this is a testament to
41. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Education Groups Call for Relief from
NCLB Mandates (May 27, 2011), http://www.neatoday.org/20o/5/27/education
-groups-call-for-relief-from-nclb-mandates.
42. See, e.g., Gov. Signs Bill Defying No Child Left Behind, L.A. TIMEs, May 3, 2005, at
A15-
43. See, e.g., Inst. of Educ. Scis., What Works Clearinghouse, U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC.,
http://www.ies.ed.gov/nceelwwc (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (showing the U.S. De-
partment of Education's efforts to make best practices and resources available to
states and the public at large).
44. See What's in a Zip Code?: A Look at Inequality in Our Public Schools (NBC News
television broadcast Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.msnbc.com/id/
21134540/vp/44763442#44763442 (panel discussion examining the last ten years of
education reforms and their impact on education inequity).
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the aggressive ways in which states and districts have evolved under the Race to
the Top and Investing in Innovation frameworks. These incentives provided
financial momentum, allowed states to navigate their own local politics by
letting them design their own plans, and freed states from other regulations to
do more innovative work.45 NCLB should include a method to ensure that far
more of the Department of Education's state funding is based on competitive
grants. This method would allow state-developed best practices to organically
emerge as the template for other states rather than forcing one federal structure
on all fifty states.
The same principles should apply to funding beyond just Race to the Top
and Investing in Innovation. NCLB should push for more flexibility in how fed-
eral dollars are distributed and spent, particularly in the expenditure of special
education and Title I funding.46 Instead of distributing block grants to states for
special-needs and low-income students, the Department could encourage states
to adopt student-weighted funding. This mechanism would create a funding
multiplier for any characteristic that makes a child more expensive to educate:
non-native English speaker, special education status, or low-income. Students
with such needs would receive additional funding, and these students would
then carry those additional revenues with them to any school that they attend.
This allows the school to automatically receive the additional funds required to
educate these students. Perhaps more importantly, this funding structure could
provide a positive incentive for schools to seek out and matriculate the students
who are the most difficult to educate because the required money would be
consistently available.
This increased flexibility in the ways in which schools can spend Title I and
special-education dollars would give schools greater latitude in how to best
serve these students. Special-needs students could be placed alongside
non-special-needs students more frequently, and a support staff member could
monitor the classroom and assist multiple students rather than just one. This
would result in more direct services for students and more school-level innova-
tion that spurs new instructional best practices.
CONCLUSION
The country has been driving the educational equivalent of a Model T for
more than a decade. We know newer and more sophisticated models are ready
for the road, and expectations are building that a new model must offer fair,
45. In fact, the Obama administration's latest policies propose to relax certain NCLB
provisions if states agree to adopt certain core education reforms like teacher
evaluations. See Kevin Helliker, 'No Child' Fix Excites, Vexes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24,
2on, at A5.
46. "Title I" refers to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27. Title I funding is targeted at school districts that
serve high percentages of low-income children.
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growth-based accountability, a deep focus on teacher effectiveness, require-
ments for rigorous school turnarounds, and a long-term commitment to
competitive grant funding.
As the country continues to lurch forward with an outmoded educational
model, political pressure is mounting to force some sort of NCLB reauthoriza-
tion. However, a reauthorization will only be worthwhile if it sets a clear course
toward an outcomes-driven system. Amidst increased backlash against
accountability, assessment, and school turnaround, any legislative retreat from
those critical issues would be more pernicious than failing to reauthorize at all.
A new NCLB must signal a dramatic paradigm shift. For decades, we have
argued over which one reform would fix the entire system. The new generation
of education reform must do the opposite: Rather than searching for a
single solution, we must commit to building a system that gathers clear and
meaningful data on success and failure and uses that information to drive deci-
sions about who to hire, what to fund, and when to take dramatic action. This
means moving from an input- to an outcome-based model where, instead of
measuring one static moment of student performance, we are measuring
growth over time; instead of focusing on training before a teacher enters the
classroom, we are focusing on results once in the classroom; instead of concen-
trating on what goes into a school turnaround plan, we look at what comes out
of it; and instead of simply measuring how many dollars go into a school, we
focus on what outcomes those dollars leverage.
Despite the ample evidence of America's struggling educational system,
there is reason for impassioned optimism about the road ahead. The first gener-
ation of NCLB pushed us to measure performance and to publish the corres-
ponding data without any real sense of what we would find, how we would fix
what we found, or if it was even fixable at all. Ten years later we have seen how
dishearteningly wide the achievement gap is and how far away the goal of uni-
versal proficiency remains.
But more importantly, this data has helped us find the places where
classrooms and schools are delivering incredible results despite overwhelming
challenges. In short, the data shows us that there is a viable path to proficiency
for all students, if we focus on the breakthrough practices that are generating
positive results. Unexpectedly, the resistance to this data is much fiercer when
we know that success is possible. In a world where we know that swift and cou-
rageous action can change outcomes, there is a far greater fear of evidence to
this effect, because that evidence demands action.
A new NCLB hangs in the balance, caught between those who would hide
the data for fear of what it demands, and those who believe that it is only
through the sustained revelation and evaluation of that data that we will be
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Table 1: Beach Court Elementary Case Study
Beach Court Elementary: 5th Grade
(Ninety-seven percent of students received free or reduced lunch in 2010.)













Compiled by author based on CSAP Proficiency Results, 2002-2on, DENVERPOsT.COM,
http://www.denverpost.com/csap?appSession=47516504922198 (last visited Nov. 29,
2011).
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